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Abstract. In this paper, we try reducing the moral hazard of profit
misreporting in Profit and Loss Sharing Contract (PLS). In this kind of
contracts , the corporate manager has a temptation to misreport profits
which can lead to either project failing or to financiers receiving an unfair
allocation of profits. To help in solving this problem we propose a new
model that includes a real option that gives the corporate manager (agent)
the right, but not the obligation, to gradually buy shares in the corporation
from the financier/bank. We compare our results with the standard case
of PLS without real options. We show, using a multi-agent simulation
(Netlogo) that embedding real options in the PLS contract can reduce the
profit misreporting case. The fact that PLS contracts are riskier compared
to other forms of financing such as debt, provides an incentive for the
creation of models that reduce their risk to capital providers. Given the
results obtained from our real options model, the latter could prove to be
of practical use to financial institutions willing to engage in PLS financing.
KAUJIE Classification: 131, O1
JEL Classification: C6, C7, C15
c© 2020 JIBM. All rights reserved.
INTRODUCTION
PLS contracts are forms of partnership whereby two or more partners share in capital and or
labour to undertake a project. In this specific mode of financing, the profit share is predeter-
mined and is denoted in a ratio or percentage of profits. PLS contracts do not guarantee return
on investments (Hesse & Jobst, 2008) making them different from fixed income securities.
The losses, however, must be shared with respect to each participant percentage share in the
partnership capital.
PLS are the fundamental differentiation between Islamic banks and conventional ones
(Chong & Liu, 2009; Hamza & Saadaoui, 2013) . In this context, there is no interest bearing
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deal with some specific forms of partnership called mud. ārabah or mushārakah (Mirakhor
& Zaidi, 2007). Mushārakah is a partnership where the financier/bank and the entrepreneur
jointly participate in the project with capital. hand, in mud. ārabah, it is only the financier
who finances the project while the entrepreneur provides labour and management. Both
forms are financial instruments which are akin to equity provided by banks to entrepreneurs.
As mushārakah and mud. ārabah are based on the sharing of profits as well as sharing losses,
they are of particular concern to banks (Mirakhor & Zaidi, 2007) and financiers. This
makes these forms riskier relative to conventional debts. For example, under mushārakah
contracts, if the project fails then the bank/financier jointly loses the invested capital along
with the entrepreneurs. Even worse, the bank/financier solely loses the invested capital under
mud. ārabah. This makes mud. ārabah financing to be perceived as bearing more risks com-
pared to mushārakah (Ariffin et al., 2009; Louhichi & Boujelbene, 2016; Said et al., 2013).
On the other hand, under conventional lending, banks are guaranteed interest payments
as well as capital invested. They are further immune when they impose collateral against
their funding. The second risk of mushārakah and mud. ārabah contracts is that the banks
return is entirely linked to the rate of return of the projects being financed. If the projects
are low then the bank/financier suffers lower profitability. On the other hand, under the
conventional system, the bank/ financier is concerned mainly about being paid a guaranteed
interest payment even if the rate of profitability of projects is low.
The third risk is effort shirking. Under mushārakah , and even more under mud. ārabah, the
fact that losses are shared may lead to entrepreneurs’ effort shirking as there is no obligation
to redeem any compensation to the financier. However, under conventional financing, interest
payments are not tied to profits and are therefore mandatory payments.
The fourth risk, which is the substance of this paper, is profit misreporting. Under
mushārakah and mud. ārabah, the entrepreneur oversees managing the project and has com-
plete knowledge of the profitability of the projects. The entrepreneur can act opportunistically
by hiding, misreporting, part of the project profitability, and only share a falsely declared
profit with the bank/financier. This in turn puts more burden on the bank/financier to put
costly mechanisms to minimize the misreporting risk.
The fifth risk we can relate to PLS contracts such as mushārakah and mud. ārabah is credit
risk (Warninda et al., 2019) work on mud. ārabah claims that the highest level of credit risk is
achieved when mushārakah contracts constitute 37-39% of the bank’s financing.
But despite their credit riskiness PLS contracts in both forms have got defenders. De-
fenders of PLS contracts argue that their profit and risk-sharing makes them preferred to
conventional debt contracts (Ebrahim & Safadi, 1995). This is supported by Dar and Presley
(2000) who argue that there is no justification for the claims that PLS are inefficient. Opposers
to PLS contracts, however, argue that despite their overwhelming advantages, they suffer
heavily from the presence of asymmetric information such as profit misreporting. They also
argue that, contrary to debt contracts, there is less protection from losses to the financiers as
they cannot claim guarantees against losses. This is true if managers enjoy the upsides of
investment and are protected against its failures (Cornelli & Yosha, 2003). In such a delegated
investment framework, Harris et al. ()1982) claims agents are tempted to misreport profits
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to have the rest of the undeclared profits for personal use. In such a framework, managers
have a temptation for empire building by diverting free cash flows inappropriate investments
(Bernardo et al., 2001; Harris & Raviv, 1996). This issue of profit misreporting makes PLS
contracts less of a preferred mode of financing (Zaher & Kabir Hassan, 2001) to financiers in
comparison to other modes such as debt contracts (Aggarwal & Yousef, 2000; Ahmed, 2002;
Khan, 1985; Khan, 1986).
Some solutions were proposed to reduce the problem of misreporting in PLS contracts.
One way is randomized monitoring which is argued to be the most effective way of preventing
the underreporting problem Khan (1985). In line with monitoring, higher due diligence is
proposed in PLS in comparison with conventional PLS (Al-Suwailem, 2006). Our model is
different from those two arguments in the following way. Monitoring itself is costly. In our
model, the corporate manager is induced to properly report profits as he gradually owns the
corporation for which he is paying the real option premium.
Another method is employing the corporate manager under a low job protection scheme.
Under this method, a manager offers to be employed under low job terms to signal his
managerial confidence. This approach is criticised for its unfairness as projects’ failure can
be due to factors beyond the agents’ scope of control (Elfakir & Tkiouat, 2015b).
There have been many works that tried to reduce asymmetric information in PLS contracts.
For example, the agent’s financial participation in the project’s capital (Karim, 2002) may
reduce moral hazard. This work is consistent with the work of Nabi (2013) who suggests
agents to put in a minimum capital as well as be awarded a minimum profit share. This is
also in line with other research (Elfakir & Tkiouat 2015a; Elfakir & Tkiouat, 2015b) which
rationally claims that under the PLS contract, moral hazard is reduced as both agents face the
same destiny of losing their capital. This is also consistent with Inness (1990) who claims
that contracts with a sharing arrangement are not feasible when they are unilaterally financed.
Those approaches are like ours, in terms of capital sharing, but do not treat the problem of
profit misreporting. We propose the introduction of ‘Diminishing PLS contracts’ whereby
the share of the financier is purchased gradually by the corporate manager (Usmani, 2002).
In our opinion, this represents an efficient mechanism of reducing profit misreporting risk. In
fact, as the financier gets his ownership of the corporation reduced, the risks of the projects
are also gradually transferred to the corporate manager. In addition to this, we propose that to
buy the share of the financier, the corporate manager pays a real option premium. The right
to buy is conditioned by the fact that the firm must reach a minimum threshold value. This
encourages the corporate manager to truly report profit if she wants to gain total ownership
in a short time.
Given the above literature, profit misreporting seems to be a challenging aspect in PLS
contracts corporate governance compared to standard debt. This paper tries to reduce this
risk by combing PLS contracts with real options.
The agents’ behaviour (in our case the financier/bank and the corporate manager), besides
the dynamic relationship between the two, are complex phenomena. For this reason, we make
recourse to two techniques: 1) game theory and 2) agent-based simulation (explained in the
next section). The contribution of this work manifest itself in three ways: First, PLS contracts
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are more complex than debt contracts; so standard debt contracting methods do not apply in
this framework. Second, we believe that no previous work has been done to introduce real
options in PLS analysis. Third, this work is unique as the work is tested using a personally
programmed agent-based model. The latter allows for a user-friendly interface whereby the
financier can input project key data and calculate easily the related output (option premium,
firm value, exit point, monetary incentives etc.)
The rest of this paper will proceed in the following way:
Part 2 explains agent-based simulation and why we use it in this study. Part 3 explains the
model. Part 4 identifies the mythology adopted. Part 5 introduces the results and provides a
discussion; and finally, we conclude with summary and further venues of extension.
Agent Based Modelling (ABM)
Rational of using ABM
ABM is a computational methodology and simulation that provides more flexible ways to
understand complex problems from the perspective of its behavioural entities (Bonabeau,
2002; Wilensky & Rand, 2015). Rand and Rust (2011) note that a complex environment
can be modelled by describing simple characteristics of agents’ behaviour. ABM allows
the organized behaviour of a system (emergent phenomena) to be observed without being
explicitly encoded in the simulation (Xiang et al., 2005). The ABM can replicate real systems
(Yahyaoui & Tkiouat, 2018) or explore phenomena that may not even exist in the real world.
It enables researchers to discover what will happen when they assume a few basic rules
(Wilensky & Rand, 2015). Some researchers have gone so far as to consider ABM as a new
way of doing science using computer-based experiments (Axelrod, 1997; Macal & North,
2006; Wilensky and Rand, 2015). Naciri and Tkiouat (2015) confirm that ABM can be used
to solve many practical problems where other modelling tools show their limitation. Equation
Based Modelling (EBM) is a top-down approach that usually studies the global behaviour
of the modelled system, but not the reasons locally leading to that behaviour. However, the
ABM is a bottom-up approach; it can model the interactions between individual agents and
explain the phenomena resulting from these interactions (Naciri & Tkiouat, 2015). Therefore,
the ABMs provide more detailed results than EBMs (Wilensky & Rand, 2015). Indeed,
ABM naturally describes a system (Bonabeau, 2002) as its concept is much closer to natural
thinking (Wilensky & Rand, 2015). ABM also can embed features difficult to incorporate in
an analytical model. In an agent-based model, individuals can have bounded rationality, be
heterogeneous, adaptive and located within geographical space (Rand & Rust, 2011).
The use of ABM can be different from one model to another; it can be used for giving a
simplified description of real or artificial phenomena, explaining the mechanisms and phe-
nomenon that control a system, doing experiments for understanding an engineered system,
or for making predictions (Wilensky & Rand, 2015).
The rationales cited above are useful for our work in two ways: 1) the relationship between
financier/bank and the manager is complex from a behavioural point. In other words, the
manager will always have the temptation to misreport profits while the financier wants to
maximize his wealth but minimize the chances of misreporting. 2) Since the relationship is a
288 ELFAKIR, A., TKIOUAT, M., Fairchild, R., & Pakgohar, A. - Can real option reduce .... 2020
dynamic one, it is hard to track and predict performance and misreporting behaviour over
time. Therefore, a simulation tool is needed for this purpose. In our case, we are going to use
Netlogo1, a famous and widely used tool for agent-based simulation.
Fundamental Steps in ABM
An agent-based model refers to a model that is composed of agents. Wilensky and Rand
(2015) define agents as autonomous decision-making entities with properties and behavioural
rules in a computer simulation. They, agents, include consumers, producers, entrepreneurs,
institutions (banks), governments, markets, etc. Based on their behavioural rules, agents can
interact with each other and/or with their environment (Garcia, 2005). For instance, if we
consider an entrepreneur as an agent, it might have properties such as "project", "wealth"
and "productivity" as well as the decision-making process; for example, an entrepreneur
agent might have the rule to select a new project. Macal and North (2006) emphasize that
typically, an agent is characterized by his/her independent decision-making ability, ranging
from simple to complex rules. According to the literature, agent-based modelling nictitates
the respect of certain fundamental steps:
1. Decide if ABM is appropriate: ABM can be a useful choice when the problem
under investigation emphasizes a set of autonomous and heterogeneous entities
(agents) evolving over time and when both their micro-level behaviour and the result
of their interactions (macro-level patterns) are of interest (Garcia ,2005; Rand &
Rust, 2011; Wilensky & Rand, 2015).
2. Design the model: the modeler needs to identify the agents of the system,
their properties, their behaviours, and the environment where they live.
3. Implement the model in computational software: Many ABM toolkits exist
such as SWARM, Mason, REPAS and NetLogo.
4. Validate and verify the model: To evaluate an agent-based model and increase
confidence in its simulation, two activities are generally conducted; Verification
and Validation (V&V). Verification refers to the process of determining whether
the simulation code corresponds to the conceptual model (Zou et al., 2014) i.e. the
program does what it is supposed to do (David, 2006). Validation determines if the
conceptual framework and the simulation output accurately represent the real word
(Zou et al., 2014).
5. Using the model as a decision-making tool: Once an agent-based model is
verified and validated, it can be used for running a series of computational exper-
iments based on different combinations of inputs. The generated results can be
analyzed using standard statistical methods.
1NetLogo is a multi-agent programmable modelling environment. https://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/
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THE MODEL
Previously we tried to reduce asymmetric information between a bank and a risk-neutral
corporate manager who requires funding a project costing F. He is endowed with personal
wealth f and requires additional resources F- f to complete his project’s funding requirement
(Elfakir & Tkiouat, 2016).
The project is at the risk of being profit (Πt) misreported with a degree θt ε[01]. The rate
of return of the project is given as r .
The manager has an opportunity cost c% given as a percentage of his capital contribution.







= θtΠt = θt . (1 + rt) .F (1)
The financier share of the project is given as α, while his loss share is βt . The specific
nature of the PLS contract dictates that the % loss βt of each partner should not exceed their
% contribution in the capital.
We extend this model by having the corporate manager gradually buying the part of the
bank in the project conditioned on the buying of a real option premium.
We look at scenarios where the real option is used and the case where it is not used. To
facilitate the calculations, we refer to Y = 1 and Y = 0 as the case where the real option is
used and not used respectively. Taking a conventional number of shares as 100, the value of



















W AACt is the weighted average cost of capital at each round t and is given as:
W AACt = βt .ρ + (1 − βt) .c (5)
N is the cumulative standard normal , N(d1) and N(d2) are probability factors and distribu-










nt is the number of shares to be purchased by the corporate manager from the bank at the end
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In this case, both agents/manager and bank, cooperate, i.e. the bank charges a lower sharing







= [αt (1 + rt) − (1 + ρ) βt]F + Rt−1.Yt−1 (7)







= [(1 − αt) (1 + rt) − (1 + c) (1 − βt)]F + Rt−1.Yt−1 (8)
The Asymmetric Case
Under this case, both participants are unaware of their counterpart’s hidden potential strate-
gies: i.e cooperate or defect. To solve this problem we use a repeated game approach and
simulate its results using a multiagent simulation (Netlogo). The strategies available for each
participant are:
• Cooperate: The financier/bank would cooperate by taking a small profit sharing ratio αlt
while the agent manager truly reports profits.
• Defect: The bank requests a high profit ratio αht which includes a misreporting risk




. The manager on the other hand falsely reports profits.
METHODOLOGY
FIGURE 1. The Netlogo interface under some initial parameters
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We simulate our work in an agent-based simulation platform, (see Fig. 1). The figure also
shows the starting parameters used to initiate the simulation.
Under each case we provide the periodic, average, and cumulative payoffs of each partici-
pant.
Both Agents Cooperate
























































FIGURE 2. The Netlogo interface under some initial parameters under both the bank and the corporate
manager cooperating














For convenience, we provide the Interface of the Netlogo simulation for this result:
The Corporate Manager Cooperates and the Financier/Bank Defects
If the bank cooperates while the corporate manager defects, then the periodic, cumulative







































































The Bank Defects and the Corporate Manager Cooperates
If the bank defects while the corporate manager cooperates, then the periodic, cumulative
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Using Netlogo we provide the calculation of each participant payoff. The calculations take
into consideration the opportunity cost of each agent in undertaking the project.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We use a 10 period timscale and simulate our model using the decision parameters. In each
case, we identify the payoffs to the participants in the cases of diminishing PLS with real
option (RO+) and without real option (RO−). Also, we identify the Nash Equilibrium of each
case. In case the Nash Equilibrium is found, we identify the social value as the total of the
participant’s payoffs.
To encourage the corporate manager to accept the real option, we introduce an incentive λ
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We start by initial parameters as our starting point of the simulatio:θt = 30%; α = 50%; Rp =
20%; r = 35%; p = 25%; c = 12%; βt = 60%; F = 100000. At each simulation, we change
a parameter at a time while maintaining the rest of the initial parameters as constants: The
results of our simulation are shown in the appendix figures. The first simulation of the model
under the initial values is given below. The other simulations of the model under the changes
in the values of the initial parameters are given in the appendix.
FIGURE 3. The game under initial parameters of the simulation
The Fig. 4 shows a summary of the simulation results:
FIGURE 4. Summary table of the simulation results
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It is clearly apparent that under each simulation a Nash Equilibrium emerges. Yet this
equilibrium depends on whether we use a real option or not.
If we do not use a real option, Nash equilibrium emerges as DD in which case the bank
defects by charging a high profit sharing ratio and the corporate manager defects by misre-
porting. This is a bad equilibrium state for two reasons: 1) If the bank takes a higher profit
sharing ratio, this can deter safe entrepreneurs and only attract riskier ones. This is similar to
a conventional banking sector where credit rationing happens when a bank takes a higher
interest payment which deters safe entrepreneurs and attracts riskier ones (Bester, 1985a,
1985b).
If we use a real option, a Nash equilibrium emerges as DC in which case the bank defects
by charging a high sharing ratio, and the corporate manager cooperates by not misreporting.
Under this case, a higher social value emerges compared to the case where we do not use
real options.
While this case, with real options, still has the case of the bank defecting by taking a higher
share, it is better than the case without real options where the entrepreneur’s best strategy is
to misreport.
Since the case of real option results in the corporate manager cooperating and results in a
higher social value, we would like the corporate manager to accept the real option contract.
To do so we introduce a monetary incentive mechanism. Our agent-based simulation proves
that a high social value is maintained while inducing the corporate manager to cooperate.
Conclusion
In this work, we attempted to reduce profit misreporting in PLS contracts by embedding real
options. We have made recourse to game theory and agent-based simulation. We compare
the performance of PLS combined with real options and the performance of PLS without
real options. The simulation result shows that under real options a Nash Equilibrium exists
when the bank charges a higher sharing ratio (Defect) and the corporate manager cooperates
by truly reporting profits. Under no real option, however, a Nash equilibrium exists under the
bank charging a high ratio (Defect) and the corporate manager defecting by misreporting.
The simulation evidence shows a higher social value when real options are embedded in
the PLS contracts. An incentive is proposed to foster this high social value. We found
evidence that accepting the real option results in a higher social value than if the corporate
manager refuses the real option. Due to the agency problem of profit misreporting, this model
can be a good corporate governance tool for financiers in general, and banks in particular,
willing to engage in PLS contracts as an equity investment. The results of this model have
policy implications. Indeed, we have shown how real options can reduce the risk of profit
misreporting. Since this is one of the main moral hazards risk in PLS contracts, its reduction
may lead many financial institutions to increase their offer of PLS contracts.
Another policy implication is that conventional systems may be more motivated to adopt
PLS contracts. While we do not expect conventional banks to eradicate interest-bearing
funding but their adoption of PLS contracts, with our real options model, may reduce interest-
bearing trading. This should, therefore, induce conventional systems to have an active
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engagement in productive activities rather than being passive under lending’s transactions.
Another policy implication is that our model may increase the PLS offer of Islamic banks
relative to their offer of other ‘debt-like’ products such as Ijara (leasing) or Murabaha.
There are further venues to extend this study. First, this model can be extended to include
different types of financiers (VC’s and Angels, Conventional banks), along with the ones
engaged in PLS contracts. The inclusion of different financiers will add more realism to the
complexity of the model and could be a good reflection of the real market case. In the second
extension, we can compare our PLS model with another conventional setting which charges
interests. The purpose would assess where misreporting is likely to happen.
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1 Appendix: Simulation results under changes of the
initial values of the model parameters
FIGURE 5. The game under an increase in the project-profit-ratio from r=35% to 60%
FIGURE 6. Figure 5: The game under a decrease in the percentage profit declared from θ = 50% to 30%
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FIGURE 7. The game under a decrease in the corporate manager’s opportunity cost from c=12% to 7%
FIGURE 8. The game under a decrease in the bank’s opportunity cost from ρ=25% to 15%
FIGURE 9. The game under an increase in the investment from F=1000000 to 2000000
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FIGURE 10. The game under a decrease in the risk free rate from R f =6% to 2%
FIGURE 11. The game under a increase in the volatility of return from θ=16% to 30%
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